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Presentation
We present this paper on the so called “Money laundering” or the legitimization of assets coming from illegal activities in the Central American Isthmus, aware of the fact that the issue is very complex to investigate, and even more complex 
to document. 
But it agrees with the recommendations we made for decision makers in the paper 
that on organized crime in Central America we published in 2011. In fact, the attention 
on Money laundering was the fi rst of the recommendations in that document. Why? 
First, because money laundering is a criminal activity that goes almost inadvertent but 
which bears a lethal impact in our societies and in our institutionalism: the legitimization 
of assets coming from illegal activities would seem to be invisible for the common citizen 
and it would seem to only be important for those authorities responsible for supervising 
Banks and overseeing monetary stability. Primary attention is always concentrated on 
violent deaths, but the issue of Money laundering or the legitimization of assets is very 
seldom dealt with in the region. 
Laundering Money is an operation that per se, does not yield blood, corpses or 
strident violent deeds. But it is an activity that has a tremendous corrupting power in our 
societies and institutions. The preceding crimes that generate the need to launder their 
gains in our productive and fi nancial systems, as well as the number of crimes that result 
from those actions, when they create networks and processes and laundering enterprises 
which corrupt a large diversity of activities and of public and private institutions, should be 
enough to have this activity in the sight of our national and regional efforts to strengthen 
the prevention and prosecution of crime. 
Furthermore, we are small countries with fragile institutions and security systems, 
suffering from a constant drain of public resources to meet the fi ght against crime 
and citizen insecurity. Until recently, we did not produce any drugs. They were mainly 
generated in the Andean countries – it is not but until a short time ago that some signs 
were detected of the existence of small clandestine laboratories for the production of 
synthetic drugs in three of the Central American countries. And the major market is to 
the north. But our public budgets are “skewed” and augmented for the fi ght and control 
against drug traffi cking, taking away important resources from other development 
issues, and even other citizen security issues that are important for us. 
In addition to this, it would be a distortion of State resources, and there are other 
distortion dimensions in the public administration, both nationally and locally, putting at 
risk governance itself by growing ineffi ciencies in the efforts for public security. In the 
face of these distortions and the citizens’ perception of the ineffi ciencies in the fi ght to 
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secure the citizens’ security, it is possible to succumb to the temptations of practical 
realism. These temptations are included in the fact that derived from describing the fi ght 
against organized crime and its sequels as ineffi cient, it might result politically “more 
reasonable” to implement public actions with a media impact, but which public opinion 
could interpret as a show to pretend doing what is possible, but in practice, the State 
would seem to resign and leave them to do as they want. This is added to the perception 
that neither some of the institutional structures called into this fi ght, precisely in those 
departments that are the ones that should guarantee public security and the Rule of 
Law: justice, security and the fi nancial systems, are adding up to the necessary efforts. 
Falling into these temptations of practical realism might make the State enter into a 
very delicate and very complex route of gestation and development of the “Mask-State” 
or the “Shell-State”: a formal public institutionalism but one that covers-up for high 
levels of impunity.
But also: fi xing eyes and developing dexterities in the fi eld of Money laundering 
coming from illegal activities concentrates efforts where it hits harder those transnational 
criminal organizations of any kind: in the possibility of enjoying their gains, once they 
have been legitimized. And here, some effi cient actions can be implemented to prevent 
illegality and the infection of our economies and our political systems, acting on numbers 
and operations that are TRACEABLE AND VERIFIABLE. And which can be later on 
connected with other operations to strengthen justice and security, both nationally and 
regionally. 
This paper, however, had enormous diffi culties to gather reliable and publicly 
verifi able information on concrete facts directly related to money laundering, therefore 
it is very diffi cult to size the dimension and scope of these activities as well as their 
real impact on the legitimate universe of our economies. The authorities consulted 
shares offi cial documents (the current legislation and regulatory aspects), and shared, 
in private, their appreciations, assessments and suggestions about how to get better. But 
the banking institutions consulted in all the countries were reluctant to provide concrete 
information that could be cited. This is a problem reality generalized throughout the 
Isthmus and which had to be faced by all the member institutions of the RED in order to 
obtain support information for this paper. Nevertheless, we expect to contribute with it to 
the strategic processes of Central America, from the REGIONAL standpoint, contributing 
to the generation of public policies on the part of decision makers, thus supplementing 
and supporting the work of the SICA Secretariat and that of the specialized entities.
Eduardo Stein Barillas
Coordinator of the RED
Annette Schwarzbauer
Representative of the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation for Guatemala, 
and Honduras
Introduction
In the following pages you will fi nd the systemization of results of investigations undertaken in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, which have been the input for the analysis and formulation of recommendations to abate 
the money laundering from a regional approach. 
The fi rst chapter sketches a conceptual frame in which the defi nition is revised, 
as well as the stages it entails, the forms utilized for the legitimization of capitals, the 
crimes preceding money laundering, as well as international conventions and statements 
that have developed tools for its combat. 
A second chapter makes a recognition of the efforts made by the Central American 
countries to update their internal legislation, responding to the commitments made when 
they ratifi ed international conventions on the Prevention of Money Laundering and against 
the Financing of Terrorism (PLD/CFT), although some examples are also shown which 
evidence the disparity with respect to the juridical scope of its criminal prosecution. This 
chapter also shows the diffi culties found by public institutionalism due to its inexistence 
or weakness, it being necessary to investigate and prosecute crimes in the national level, 
and carry out the investigation and exchange of fi nancial information, in the regional 
level. Specially, this chapter emphasizes on the effects that money laundering produces 
in the region, in terms of poverty, slow development, corruption, ungovernability and 
distortion of the market. 
Towards the implementation of actions to abate money laundering is the title of 
the third chapter, which makes proposals for action that include the design of a regional 
strategy against the bleaching of capitals, and other punctual actions to contribute to the 
abatement of money laundering in Central America, grouped in three strategic areas: 
a) prevention and detection; b) investigation, and c) judgment. In addition, it suggests 
to act in terms of strengthening the electoral systems and those of political parties as 
well as policies of transparency and probity in public management. 
The fourth chapter points out at conclusions and recommendations leading to 
reaffi rm the association of money laundering with corruption and impunity problems in 
the Central American States, affecting the democratic coexistence in a State of Law, as 
well as its governance.
Finally you will fi nd in the section of Annexes, a list of standards and provisions by 
country, which have been enacted to combat the laundering of money and other assets. 
The institutions that make up laRed wish to thank all those who collaborated to 
generate the inputs for analysis of this study, although it has not been possible to 
mention them as sources of information in all the cases. 

Money Laundering or 
Legitimization of Assets
The history of money laundering just as the national or global economic crimes is as ancient as the history of society itself. It goes back as far as the moment when money began to be minted and in fact, the crimes “with money (both forfeiting and 
laundering) have existed even before money existed as we know it today”, the custom 
or usage to employ practices to disguise income from illegal activities when usury was 
declared to be a crime. (Uribe Roberto, 2003).
Nevertheless, the concept of laundering begins to be used more frequently, in the 
20’s in the United States, a time when the Mafi a that traffi cked with alcoholic beverages, 
created a series of laundries to hide the illegal origin of the money they earned with 
their criminal activities. The mechanism they used was the presentation of the earnings 
coming from illegal activities in the business of cleaning clothes, most payments were 
made in cash, a situation reported to the Internal Revenue Service of the United States 
of America1. 
The income coming from extortions, prostitution and traffi cking of weapons and 
alcoholic beverages was mixed with those of washing clothes, and unable to distinguish 
which dollar or cent came from a legal activity or not, they managed to circumvent the 
authorities for a long time. 
In the 70s, money laundering became associated to drug traffi cking, when large 
amounts of money were deposited in Banks (in the United States), without control, as 
a product of the marketing of drugs. “In 1982 it was the fi rst time that the expression 
was used judicially with the seizure of bleached money, allegedly originating from the 
smuggling of cocaine.” (Tondini Bruno, s.f.)
With the upsurge of drug traffi cking, money laundering rose to a higher level. The 
amounts of money originating from the sale of drugs, since it takes place with low 
denomination banknotes, are so large that they exceed, for instance, the weight of the 
traffi cked drug. 
It is important to point out, that the logic of deregulating the global fi nancial system, 
as well as interconnection and the facility to carry out fi nancial transactions in the global 
level over the past 20 years, mainly originated in the developed countries, have resulted 
in increasing facilities to launder money: banking secrecy, the diffi culties to carry out 
1  Federal Agency of the United States Government, in charge of tax collection and the enforcement 
of the tax laws of the Treasury of the United States of America. 
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information exchanges in real time, the practice of establishing fi scal paradises (or 
shadowy jurisdictions), worsen the magnitude of the problem.
Presently, the growing activity of organized crime, poses the urgent need to 
undertake state actions to control and repress effi ciently the multiple and complex illegal 
activities that are generated around this criminal activity.2
1.1 Defi nition and stages of money laundering
The process for legitimization of capitals and their perverse effects in the economic 
and political structures of the countries is a concern not only of the affected States, but it 
transcends to the international community due to the continuity and multiplicity of illegal 
conducts that take place in different States and even in Continents. 
As a consequence, the recycling of money has been defi ned according to the 
characteristics of each country and their respective legislations; however, in most 
concepts, it is considered a crime in itself, distinguished from the crimes that originated 
it, and therefore it has been assigned an independent treatment by the system of criminal 
justice. 
Dr. Guillermo Ritcher, (President of the Commission of Government, National Police 
and anti-Drugs Action of the Congress of Bolivia), defi nes money laundering as: the selfi sh, 
clandestine procedure, by which the funds or earnings coming from illegal activities, such 
as: weapons, prostitution, traffi cking of women, common crime, economic, political and 
related crimes, contraband, tax evasion and drug traffi cking, are recycled to the normal 
circuit of capitals or goods and then used by means of heterogeneous and tactically 
skilled cunning (Luengas, Vianeth.2010).
The “Reference Guide against laundering of assets and the fi ght against the fi nancing 
of terrorism” refers to the laundering of assets as a basically simple concept: “It is a 
process through which the earnings obtained through a criminal activity are covert in 
order to hide their illegal origin. Basically, the laundering of assets covers the earnings 
obtained from goods of a criminal origin rather than from the goods per se.”
In order to understand the complexity of the legitimization process it is necessary 
to know the different phases or stages through which the laundering or bleaching of 
capitals and on which there is an agreement among those who study the issue, pointing 
out that the most usual ones and those used by the Group of International Financial 
Action against money laundering (GAFI)3 are:
• Placement. It refers to placing the funds of illegal origin in the fi nancial system, in 
various ways: opening bank accounts, transactions in currency, purchase of fi nancial 
instruments, among others. 
2 The crimes that produce considerable gains which are later legitimized are: traffi cking of persons 
for sexual exploitation, prostitution, marriage or forced labor, illegal adoptions, traffi cking of 
migrants, marketing of boys, girls and human organs, trade and traffi cking of weapons, drug 
traffi cking, their wholesale or retail distribution, the manufacturing of precursors, smuggling 
and corruption. 
3 For its French initials (GAFI) –Groupe d’action fi nanciére sur le blanchiment de capitaux (GAFI) 
is an inter-governmental institution created in 1989 by the G7, the purpose of which is to 
develop policies that help to combat money laundering and fi nancing terrorism. 
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• Hiding. Called stratifi cation, collation or diversifi cation by some theoreticians. The 
objective of this stage is to zoom out the illegal gains from their criminal source. The 
methods used in this stage are: 
√ Money converted into instruments of payment through the purchase of securities, 
transfers between jurisdictions or “payments” are made for acquired goods or 
services.
√ Electronic transfer of funds (currently it is the most used and effi cient method)”. 
 At the end of this stage, “the legitimizer” has separated the money from its illegal 
origin and has erased the accounting traces of the illegal origin, covering it by 
means of complicated and diverse fi nancial transactions. 
• Integration or investment. In this stage, the money becomes integrated into the 
legitimate economy, the “clean money” is injected into the national and international 
fi nancial systems; at this moment, the objective is to invest the clean money in 
various forms of the chosen economy (ies) and once it has been integrated into a 
particular fi nancial system, these gains appear to be legal, melting and blending 
with the rest of the legal activities of the infi ltrated economy. 
Due to the characteristics of the laundering of assets, no accurate statistics can be 
made that give an exact account of the magnitude of the problem in the world level, 
because the persons and organizations dedicated to illegal activities avoid being detected 
and do not leave public records of their transactions. As stated by Calvin Wilson, Director 
of GAFIC, to a TV program in Venezuela, on occasion of holding the XXXIV Plenary 
Meeting and the XXXIV Meeting of the Council of Ministers of GAFIC in the Cayman 
Islands, money laundering in the world amounts to US$500 thousand million per year4. 
In this sense, it should be stressed that “in the world and particularly in Latin America, 
the three major crimes that precede the laundering of assets are: the sale of drugs, 
corruption of public authorities and tax evasion”, so it was pointed out by Gabriel Gomez, 
Magistrate of the Supreme Court of Justice of Guatemala in the frame of the Seminar 
of “Public Finance and Tax evasion in Latin America” as recorded in the report of the 
Rapporteur. 
1.2 Typologies 
The forms that the delinquents use to legitimize the assets generated through illegal 
activities are several and depend upon the characteristics of each country and of the 
means utilized. In addition, they change with time according to the measures that the 
states implement to tackle the problem. Such forms are called, methods or typologies. 
In this sense, both GAFI and the regional groups are constantly drafting technical 
tabs on the typologies of money laundering, which they systematically update. The 
Egmont5 Group has also made a broad compilation of cases to share them with its 
members. 
4 See the Paper Correo Del Orinoco, Caracas, Jul. 12, 2012.
5 The Egmont Group is an international organization that gathers governmental organizations, 
made up by Units of Financial Intelligence (UIFs) creating an international network to Exchange 
information, knowledge and technology in order to fi ght against the laundering of assets and 
the fi nancing of terrorism. 
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These designed typologies contribute to implement control instruments and warning 
signs for the prevention of conducts associated with money laundering and the fi nancing 
of criminal organizations. 
Regarding the Group of Financial Action of South America (GAFISUD)6, in 2010 it 
made a support tool to contribute to the implementation, adjustment and improvement 
of controls in tackling the money laundering, which contains the typologies used more 
frequently in Latin American countries (GAFISUD, 2010), among which are:
• Laundering of funds coming from defrauding public funds, 
• Laundering of funds through casinos,
• Exploitation and marketing of gold to fi nance terrorism,
• Utilization of fi nancial products of cooperative societies and mutual 
associations7.
• Declared income of foreign currency for exchange operations, 
• Transport of currency across borders, 
• Creation of investment societies,
• Clandestine transportation of precious metals through borders. 
• Utilization of front companies to support the activities of laundering assets 
(fi scal paradises),
• Use of Call-Centers and online businesses for the mobilization and hiding of 
funds,
• Irregular utilization of pension funds, 
• Importation of raw materials and machinery
• Utilization of non-profi t entities that provide education services. 
1.3 International Organizations that certify standards
The existence of more fl exible transfer mechanisms in an interconnected world, 
together with the recognition that drug traffi cking is a worldwide problem, ellicits 
multilateral efforts of collaboration. That is how international organizations that certify 
standards arose, from the United Nations, to the Egmont Group that certifi es the standards 
under which the fi nancial intelligence units of the countries must be created, to improve 
on the policies of prevention and Exchange of information in an international level.
6 Inter-governmental organization with a regional basis that groups nine Latin American countries: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay, México, Costa 
Rica and Panama; with the purpose of fi ghting money laundering and the fi nancing of terrorism. 
7 This typology refers to the use of fi nancial products that can be issued by Cooperative 
Associations and Mutual entities, benefi tting from the lack of suffi cient supervision controls on 
the part of the Financial System. 
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a) Organization of the United Nations
It was the fi rst one to establish a universal basis of actions to combat the laundering 
of assets and the juridical instruments through which it has initiated actions: 
• The Vienna Convention. Through its program for drug control, it began with the 
international agreement “United Nations convention against illegal traffi cking of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances”. It was passed in 1988, entered into 
force in 1990 and had the participation and subscription of 169 countries. 
• The Palermo Convention. It refers to the “International Convention against 
transnational organized crime” of the United Nations. It broadens the range of 
crimes underlying the laundering o assets, it entered into force in 2003, subscribed 
by 147 countries and ratifi ed by 83. This international covenant focuses on the 
provisions on issues of laundering of assets in the same terms as the GAFI.8
b) Group of Financial Actions on the Laundering of Assets (GAFI)
This is a sui generis organization which accepts members by invitation only, and 
not by compliance with requirements, as is the case in other international organizations. 
At the present time, it is formed by 32 countries of which three belong in Latin America 
(México, Brazil and Argentina).
 This group certifi es the international standards by which the rest of the countries in 
the world are rated; this way, “black lists” are drafted and sanctions are imposed to the 
nations that do not comply with the established standard. 
The tree main functions of the GAFI with respect to the laundering of assets are: 
1. Oversee the progress of the members in the application of measures against the 
laundering of assets. 
2. Analyze and issue reports on the trends, techniques and countermeasures of the 
laundering of assets; and 
3. Promote the approval and application of the GAFI standards against the laundering 
of assets throughout the world. 
The instruments through which GAFI makes its functions effective are mainly: 
• The 40 recommendations on the laundering of assets. These refer to a series of 
principles for the countries to act in their fi ght against the laundering of assets. They 
were established in 1990 and were revised in 1996 and 2003, in order to renew 
the recommendations and update them to new international practices before the 
emergence of different typologies.9
• Supervision of the progress of members, which takes place in two stages: self-
evaluation and mutual evaluation. 
• Reports on the trends and techniques of the laundering of assets. 
8 All of the Central American countries have ratifi ed the International Convention against 
transnational organized crime. 
9 For more information on the 40 recommendations on laundering of assets, visit the web page 
http://www.cnc.gob.ve/info/40%20Recomendaciones%20GAFI-2012.pdf
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• The lists of Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories (PTNC). Since GAFI can only 
give sanctions to its members and since its objective is to certify standards for 
international compliance, it uses this instrument so that through their reputation, 
the countries implement the 40 recommendations on money laundering and the 9 
recommendation on fi nancing terrorism. 
Other regional organizations, similar to GAFI, were created to give participation to 
the other countries of the world, where they participate with a voice but without vote. 
These agencies have been organized geographically so that in Latin America we can 
mention the following: 
• Group of Financial Action of South America (GAFISUD)10 , 
• Group of Financial Action of the Caribbean (GAFIC)11
c) Basel Committee of Banking supervision
It was created in 1974 by the presidents of the central banks of 13 countries12 and 
is the entity in charge of certifying international standards for bank supervision. Among 
the instruments issued that relate to the laundering of assets are: 
Statement of principles on the laundering of assets: this statement summarizes the 
basic policies and procedures that it would be convenient for the management bodies 
of the Banks to ensure their existence in the institutions in order to collaborate in the 
elimination of the laundering of assets through the banking system, both nationally and 
internationally. 
• Basic principles of banking operations. 
• Due diligence with the client.
d) Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units 
In 1995, several units of fi nancial intelligence formed the so-called Egmont group. The 
objective of the group is to improve support to the national programs against laundering 
and coordinate the initiatives along this line: the support includes a systemization of the 
exchange of fi nancial intelligence information, improve technical knowledge and promote 
a better communication among fi nancial information units (UIF), and support its creation 
throughout the world. 
The Egmont group agreed to the defi nition of Financial Intelligence Unit as “National 
Central Unit in charge of receiving (and if allowed, socializing), analyzing and transferring 
to the competent authorities, communications on fi nancial information: i) related to 
funds that are suspected of a criminal origin and a possible funding of terrorism, or ii) 
10 Ibid
11 The Caribbean Financial Action Group (GAFIC) is an organization formed by twenty-nine states 
of the Caribbean basin, who have agreed to implement common countermeasures to respond 
to the problem of money laundering. With the exception of Costa Rica and Panama, all of the 
Central American countries are members of this organization. 
12 The representatives of the supervision authorities of the central Banks that form the Basel 
committee for Banking Supervision are of the following countries: Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United 
States, and two more countries that are not members of the G-10, Luxembourg and Spain.
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required by the national standards, in order to combat the bleaching of capitals and the 
funding of terrorism” (Egmont Group, 2001). In addition, it agreed to a procedure to 
verify that an UIF complies with the above defi nition with a view to become a member 
of this Egmont Group; among whose criteria, it stresses having the legal capacity and 
the desire to cooperate in order to combat the bleaching of capitals and the funding of 
terrorism. With the exception of Nicaragua, all of the Central American countries are 
members of the Group through their respective UIFs.

Money laundering in the 
Central American region 
The geopolitical location of Central America and the Regional Agreement on Procedures CA-4 for the extension of the single Central American visa enables free transit without an immigration control for persons and goods, which encourages, as 
a negative effect, the vulnerability at the borders, facilitating transnational marketing of 
illegal products, persons, psychotropic substances and contraband of goods. 
Covered by this agreement and the weakness of controls, crime easily passes 
through the borders of the Central American nations, and it has a domino effect in 
the Isthmus, since what happens in one State affects the neighboring nations, which 
explains the intra-regional displacement of the inter-related networks of organized crime 
when the prosecution increases in any country of the region. 
The hardening of the fi nancial regulations in Mexico and the strengthening of actions 
for a direct combat against drug traffi cking have caused the laundering activities to move 
into Central America. This calls for legal reforms, but also needs the strengthening of 
institutional prevention mechanisms for money laundering and of the judicial system to 
prosecute and sanction those responsible. 
It also calls for a strong pressure and fi ght against criminal and drug traffi cking 
organizations carried out by the States located in the geographic ends of Central America, 
to the North in Mexico and to the south in Colombia; as is the case of Guatemala, whose 
weakness might be evidence of the increase in the presence of these groups in the region. 
Thus, “the activities of organized crime have evolved in such a way that they go 
beyond the idea that the region is a bridge or a warehouse” (laRed, 2011), turning Central 
America into the service station that drug traffi ckers and organized crime use to stock up 
and guarantee the shipment of their merchandise to the United States of America, and 
have adequate conditions for the return of the earnings that illegal activities generate. 
Criminal enterprises and their operations are successful to a good extent, since they 
achieve to bleach and cover their earnings by transferring them through the national and 
international fi nancial systems into the region. To that, we must add, “the absence of 
an effi cient system against money laundering or the existence of a lax or corrupt one in 
a specifi c country that allows criminals to operate using their fi nancial gains to broaden 
their criminal purposes and promote illegal activities” (Montoya, s.f.). 
In the face of the criminal phenomena and the conditions of violence, the Central 
American countries with the support of international organizations have undertaken 
actions of a legislative, judicial, police and migratory nature to prosecute and sanction 
these crimes and in some cases have resorted to extraordinary security measures and 
plans, without to this date, making a signifi cant progress that can be noticed. 
2
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Paradoxically, together with the efforts aimed at combating crime, the Central American 
region is facing an alarming increase in violence and organized crime, where the criminal 
groups fl aunt an enormous capacity for action and control of the transnational criminal 
Enterprise, which yields large amounts of money that enable them to have suffi cient 
resources to penetrate the economic, political and social structures of the countries of 
the region. Part of those funds coming from criminal activities and they are allegedly 
laundered in various ways in the Central American economic and fi nancial system, which 
increase their corrupting power and complicates their detection, control and abatement.
2.1 The legislation
Concerned about the multiplicity and expansion of the mechanisms for legitimization 
of capitals and their consequences, the Central American countries have adopted a 
series of commitments after the ratifi cation of international conventions that regulate 
the issue.13 In conformity with these conventions, the States must update their internal 
legislation according to the provisions contained in them (See Annex). 
In this sense, an important progress has taken place in the enactment of internal 
legislation especially of a criminal nature, since the crime of legitimization of capitals 
has been typifi ed and in addition, other criminal conducts such as corruption, abuse of 
authority, illicit enrichment, and infl uence peddling, among others have been added. 
In the criminal processing legislation some advances can also be identifi ed; in 
some countries there are special investigation techniques that are adequate for the 
investigation and prosecution of this type of crimes; also in the tax regulations to prevent 
contraband, tax evasion and elusion, a well as money laundering. But the fact that a 
certain type of legislation exists only in some countries and not in others, is perhaps the 
greatest diffi culty in the efforts to effi ciently tackling this problem..
Despite the legislative progress taking place in the countries of the region, they 
show a disparity, which makes evident the lack of legislative uniformity in the regional 
level and explains why their scope is uneven. Thus, for example, in El Salvador the 
related crimes are placed among those that attempt against the economic order, while in 
Costa Rica they are in the category of crimes against the administration of justice, which 
makes it diffi cult to have a harmonized regional judicial interpretation. 
In the case of Guatemala, according to its current regulations, the banking sector, 
fi nancial associations, the Stock Exchange, the sector of insurance, the “Off Shore”, 
Banks, cooperatives and the entities making transfers of funds in cash or securities, 
under the supervision of the Banks Superintendent, must report suspicious operations 
and the making of the respective fi les for later investigations by the Attorney General’s 
offi ce to prevent the laundering of assets. 
In Nicaragua, the cooperatives, associations and non-profi t organizations who 
manage an important volume of fi nancial services, are out of any regulations and 
supervision and they do not comply with the minimum obligations established in the 
lagislat6ion against money laundering. 
13 Among the international conventions ratifi ed by the Central American countries are: the United 
Nations Convention against the Illegal traffi cking of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime..
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Costa Rica stumbles with the diffi culty that bank secrecy is a constitutional right, 
confi dentiality or reserve is constitutionally protected, which is an obstacle in criminal 
prevention and prosecution of the money laundering crime; on its part, in Guatemala 
there is resistance to approve the law Project that modifi es the regulation protecting 
this subject issue, despite the law Project already having a favorable opinion the 
corresponding commission at the Congress of the Republic and pressures from the 
Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OCDE) to get out o a list of 
non-cooperating countries on issues of tax information which includes several countries, 
among them Guatemala. 
On another hand, both in Guatemala and in Nicaragua, the businesses or activities 
and professions that are not fi nancial, are not even considered to be obligors, the same 
goes for the case of casinos for which there is practically no regulation on the procedures 
for capitalization, the origin of their capital, or in the systemized registry of prizes granted, 
although they do not generate such a high risk as the non-regulated fi nancial institutions 
(micro fi nancial entities), since they have increased their volume of resources and their 
operations through giving micro-loans. 
According to the GAFIC in its Mutual Evaluation Report on money laundering and 
against the funding of terrorism in Nicaragua (October, 2009), in spite of the country 
having since 2008 an adequate criminal legislation to combat these crimes, it still shows 
some important limitations. 
The following are identifi ed as limitations: the scarcity of fi nancial and human resources 
in the criminal system, limited coverage of the non-regulated fi nancial sector (particularly 
the cooperative sector that has no regulations or supervision). Also there is a lack of a 
UIF and of an institutional infrastructure against money laundering, the lack of a strategy 
against integral money laundering, and the little or no coordination among institutions to 
defi ne the policies on this subject matter. The training of judges and attorneys is precarious, 
and the judicial system does not have the necessary Independence. 
Meanwhile in Costa Rica, the casinos, betting and other operations related to gaming, 
must report their activities to the UIF. Some non-fi nancial professions and commercial 
activities have legal regulations that cover aspects related to the identifi cation o clients 
whenever a commercial relation is initiated, such as the case of lawyers, Notaries Public, 
accountant and real estate agents. 
The mentioned dispositions have generated a discussion regarding the limits of the 
professional secrecy, due to the fact that the verifying authorities pretend to establish 
responsibilities for the professionals, regarding informing on actions that in their opinion 
they deem as suspicious. This contradicts what has been the traditional historical practice 
in professional services, especially the legal ones and those of audit. 
Another example is the confi scation of goods that are the product of money 
laundering. In Costa Rica, since the inclusion of the money laundering crime this criminal 
fi gure was approved, while in Guatemala it was not until December 2010 that it was 
regulated, through enactment of the Law of Extinction of Domain; El Salvador still lacks 
a specifi c legislation on the subject matter, and the same thing happens in Nicaragua. 
In Honduras, to this date, there are 24 applications submitted by the Special 
Attorney’s Offi ce for the Confi scation of Domain in the Attorney General’s Offi ce to the 
corresponding judges during the last quarter of 2011. In November 2011, two sentences 
were resolved in favor of the Honduran State, the sum of both cases amounting to 
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US$17, 340.00, a fi gure that is insignifi cant with respect to the volume of illegal 
transactions estimated to take place. 
The absence of a specifi c legislation causes the extinction of domain or confi scation 
of goods to be ruled by the ordinary normal proceedings of a criminal and civil nature, 
and substantive ones of a civil nature. Only by virtue of a judgment of guilty conviction is 
the extinction of domain applied on all types of goods confi scated and involved directly or 
indirectly in the commission of a criminal act of this nature, therefore it is indispensable 
to have the enactment of specifi c regulations on the criminal fi gure of confi scation for an 
effi cient combat of money laundering. 
Another point to be considered is the importance of distinguishing between the 
crime of legitimization of capitals and tax evasion. The difference is in the origin of the 
operations, as well as in their end purpose: tax evasion originates from legally acquired 
income that one tries to hide in order to be exempt from paying taxes, while in the 
legitimization of capitals the opposite occurs, it departs from income acquired through 
illegal means which are intended to appear as legal. 
These diffi culties become worse if we take into account that in some countries of the 
region, other conducts that are intimately related with the legitimization of capitals, such 
as illicit enrichment or criminal responsibility of employees and directors of banking, 
fi nancial and controlling institutions that facilitate or hide information regarding these 
activities, have not yet been regulated. 
The same situation is observed in complying with the 40 recommendations of the 
Group of Financial Action (GAFI), in which at the Latin American level, Guatemala ranks 
among the countries with the higher level of compliance in 55%, while Costa Rica has 
complied only with 28%. 
Graphic No. 1
Compliance with the GAFI recommendations by country
Source: Superintendence of Banks of Guatemala. 2011.
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2.2 Institutional Diffi culties
The Central American Isthmus, during the past fi ve years, faced serious diffi culties 
in the process of regional integration due to the pressures caused by political crises 
within and between countries, which restricted their development. Also, the Central 
American countries experienced economic, political, social and environmental drawbacks 
as well as resulting unequal growth. In addition, the social and economic as well as 
the political gaps have widened between Costa Rica and Panama for one part, and the 
countries of the center north on the other. 
These factors expose Central America to global threats that add up to the 
vulnerabilities it has hauled historically, such as the historical social defi cits of high levels 
of social exclusion and inequalities, in addition to the Isthmus having become the most 
violent territory of Latin America and in one of the most insecure zones of the world (The 
State of the Nation Program in Sustainable Human Development, 2011). 
In the local level, a common denominator is the scarce and frequently nonexistent 
presence of the State in the national geography, especially in the borderline rural areas. 
This particularity makes it easier to commit unpunished actions by trans-border criminal 
organizations and neutralizes the effi cient application of the juridical instruments. 
Chart No. 1
Budget of the senior comptrolling entities 
(thousands of dollars)
Budget of the senior comptrolling entities 
(thousands of dollars)
Country Entity
Annual budget
2007 2008 2009
Costa Rica General Comptroller of the Republic 22.793,8 22.294,7 24.828,3
El Salvador Accounts Court of the Republic 25.181,0 27.543,0 31.570,0
Guatemala General Comptroller of Accounts 26.086,1 35.070,7 35.584,5
Honduras Higher Court of Accounts 10.241,9 10.341,2 12.825,5
Nicaragua General Comptroller of the Republic 8.560,5 7.225,6 8.010,2
Figures estimated with the currency Exchange rate to the 31st of December of each year. 
Source: Fourth Report on the State of the Central American Region in Sustainable Human Development.
Another no less important aspect is the institutional quality that a country or groups 
of countries have. For example, Rivera, Nunez, and Villavicencio (2003), fi nd for the 
Chilean case that the effi ciency of the judicial body is an important deterrent frame in 
crime. And this agrees with a full juridical frame to fi ght the different types of crimes, 
but also by enforcing the laws, where the governmental sphere is determinant. In the 
Central American case, the inequalities in the application of the legislation adds up to the 
internal and regional legislative disparities 
Together with the regulatory diffi culties there are others of an operational nature, 
such as the diffi culty to have independent and specialized control and investigation 
bodies, or the lack of resources to adequately use the special methods of investigation, 
such as the controlled delivery, or the fi gure of the effi cient collaborator. 
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It must be added that the regulatory frame related to the control of public resources 
and money laundering has not been accompanied by strengthening the capacity in those 
institutions responsible for these issues, which have assigned very limited budgets. 
In the judicial system of the countries in the region, with the exception of Costa 
Rica, the training of judges and attorneys is precarious, however the efforts that the 
authorities make to hold training courses for this type of offi cials is recognized. The 
economic constraints inherent to the poorest countries of America and the Caribbean 
carry additional complications. 
The effects of these omissions are furthermore evident with the existing inequalities 
between the institutions in charge of the investigation and those of prosecution of 
crimes and the units of fi nancial investigation, both in fi nancial, human and technological 
resources, inequalities that go beyond the regional sphere. 
In Guatemala, the UIF called Special Verifi cation Unit (IVE) has 84 persons while the 
offi ce of the attorney in charge of prosecuting the crime of money laundering has only 
24 persons. In the case of Honduras the UIF has 26 persons, against the 6 persons in 
charge of the investigation and prosecution of money laundering. 
The situation gets worse in Nicaragua due to the inexistence of the UIF. The 
Nicaraguan private fi nancial institutions have assumed that task by reporting to the 
fi nancial comptrolling entity those suspicious operations, thus the system does not react 
effectively, promptly and timely. 
Even though the information may be transmitted on time from the UIF, there 
are delays in processing and in the action due to the scarcity or even absence of the 
accusing entities for the typologies of money laundering. In this respect, for example, 
the Guatemalan attorney’s offi ce stands out, for not having any forensic auditor or 
accountant in its service. 
The mentioned institutional inequality affects especially the performance in the 
investigation and prosecution of crime, that refl ects upon the difference between the 
number of accusations and the issuance of sentences; a clear example of this is that 
during 2009 in Guatemala there were 13 accusations fi led and 11 sentences were issued. 
To the institutional problem, corruption and impunity must be added, with a dual 
effect in the source of illegal resources and weakening the rule of law. The combination 
of both problems neutralizes or makes inoperative the actions that might come from the 
application of the law, and from the effective functioning of the institutions. 
The above evaluation, keeping distance from the Costa Rican case, is an indicator 
that there is still a lot of work to be done to improve the public institutionalism in all the 
Central American countries in order to get them closet o the establishment of the best 
international practices against the bleaching of capitals. In this respect, progress must 
be made in investigations and punishment of the corruption acts with a non-partisan and 
strengthened comptroller and judicial system. 
It must be stressed that most of the countries (El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala) 
do not have an integral strategy to combat money laundering, or a coordination structure 
that would facilitate to articulate the efforts of the different entities that are competent 
on the subject issue. 
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2.3 Operational Diffi culties
Central American trade is characterized by the practice of paying for transactions in 
cash, especially in urban areas, which facilitates the omission of records for them and 
which have the risk of involving the utilization of capitals obtained illegally. On another 
hand, much of this trade of direct sale in the food markets, ambulatory sales or artisan 
professions, is in accordance with the historical development of our societies. 
The systemic work of the institutions involved in money laundering and related 
crimes must be comprehensive and useful for its prevention, investigation and 
accusation. The lack of expert forensic auditors or accountants, in the entities in charge 
of criminal accusations, causes ignorance of what and how to ask for the information that 
is indispensable to analyze and collect the necessary evidence for the accusation and 
prosecution of the money laundering crime. 
Through the policy of “get to know your client” implemented in the banking systems, 
personal and commercial information is captured in the case of natural persons, and in 
the case of juridical persons, the legal information is added; nevertheless, the data 
obtained are not verifi ed, or updated periodically. This situation might facilitate the 
passing or movements of the resources coming from illegal operations into the fi nancial 
and banking systems, or make possible the continued recidivism of persons dedicated to 
operations of legitimization of assets. 
The economic integration of Central America calls for a fl ow in the fi nancial systems 
an in the transit of merchandise but also, this agility promotes the movement of illegal 
fl ows, which implies reconciling the interests of the Central American integration with 
the need to reduce and stop these illegal activities, in order to encourage the legitimate 
national and foreign investment in the activities that contribute to the economic and 
social development of the region. 
2.4 Effects of money laundering in the region 
Since the past decade, the penetration of illegal capitals in formal and informal 
economies was denounced, as well as in the institutionalism of the countries, together 
with the progressive social consent for its presence and utilization, particularly when these 
fl ows respond to the basic needs of communities, which the State has not accomplished 
to meet, are all growing problems in the region. So, the illegal traffi cking of resources 
generates considerable fi nancial yields and large fortunes that enable the transnational 
criminal organizations to invade, contaminate and corrupt the structures of the public 
administration, legal commercial and fi nancial activities and society in all of its levels 
(Saavedra, 1991). 
The effects for the Central American region are of a multi-cause nature, they impact 
on the micro and macro economy, on governance and democracy. 
a) Poverty, slow development and corruption
For the Economy Nobel Prize, Gary S. Becker, criminality contributes to poverty 
and a slow development when it imposes greater overhead costs to the enterprises 
and the homes by causing a negative impact on their economy. At the same time, he 
states that the high rates of criminality –which does not only involve crimes against 
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life, but a broader conception crime– are related with the low income of the population 
and corruption in the compliance with contracts and regulations. These causal relations 
become vicious circles that are diffi cult to break up. 
The Central American countries show the relation mentioned by Becker; in conformity 
with the Index of Perception of Transparency International (TI) of 2010, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and Honduras are among the Latin American countries with the higher indexes 
of corruption and with the largest number of homicides with the exception of Nicaragua 
that up to now, has been far from the regional statistics on criminality. 
In this respect, Nicaraguan security experts doubt the fi gures recorded by the 
authorities, because they do not include murders, parricides and femicides occurred, 
thereby estimating that these data are below the real fi gures.
Chart No. 2
Ranking of the percption index of corruption and number 
of homicides in central america during 2010
Country Nicaragua Honduras Guatemala El Salvador Costa Rica
Rank on 178 
countries 134 127 91 73 41
Number of 
homicides 766 6236 5960 4004 486
Homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants 13 78 41 65 11
Source: 2010 Report of Transparency International and Police Corps of Central America 
b) Ungovernance
In conformity with information from the fi nancial and banking systems of Central 
America, the largest source of illegal assets is corruption, an illegal act that attempts 
against governance and causes decomposition and demolition of its democratic systems; 
situations that give way to ungovernance and weak democracies, and at the same time, 
benefi t the market conditions and the economy of crime. 
Therefore, the impact of money laundering in the region is different from what 
it means for other countries, a problem of governance and democracy, not one of tax 
evasion. The power of illegal money is capable of buying judicial decisions, advocate in 
the course of legislative agendas, acquire protection for their goods and services, divert 
the direction of public resources for their own benefi t and acquire political power with 
the fi nancing of political parties. 
c) Market Distortion 
Organized crime and drug traffi cking hamper the normal development of the daily 
economic and traditional activities, especially in rural areas and urban areas of the 
province, because they usually carry out their operations in a frame of violence that 
generates insecurity and anxiety in the populations. At the same time, it induces the 
abandonment of activities that are usually less profi table. 
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When illegal capitals are invested in activities that are allegedly legal, such as 
livestock, they are economically and rapidly strengthened in a short time, they are 
perceived, by public opinion, as illicit; without prejudice that when legal investigations 
are made, it can in fact be confi rmed that it has been the product of an injection of illegal 
funds. In any case, these activities may affect the market prices because they are in 
the hands of the interest of crime, being able to manipulate them at their convenience. 
They can even sell their products and services at costs lower than those of the market, 
because their objective is not to generate profi t, but to preserve and hide the illicit origin 
of the funds. 
In these conditions, the legitimate enterprises cannot compete in the market. 
Even the societies or enterprises utilized to launder money can be used to control the 
industries and economic activities of some sectors, artifi cially distorting the prices of 
goods and services. 
d) Discouragement in the entrepreneurship of legal productive activities 
Organized crime and drug traffi cking take advantage of the situation of poverty and 
the lack of employment opportunities inherent to the communities of the province, to 
incorporate them into their activities in exchange for which they earn amounts of money 
that go beyond what a person could earn if employed in legal tasks. 
Before the real or apparent evidence, that activities supported with the investment 
of resources from a dubious origin yield greater profi ts or dividends fast, could discourage 
undertaking legal productive activities that would possibly require a longer time to yield. 
e)  Imprecision in the balance of payments
The diffi culties in the level of added value for economic transactions are in the 
almost impossibility to measure the impact they generate, both in the fl ow of production 
volumes and in the measurements of their value, due to the underground nature of the 
operations they carry out. 
However, through various methodologies, among them entrepreneurial surveys, the 
contribution of each one of the sectors that integrate the GNP is determined; around 
some of these sectors there has been the presumption that livestock and construction 
activities, might be receiving and covering up for investments of resources from dubious 
origin. Unfortunately, it remains being a presumption due to the diffi culty to know with 
certainty the proportion of these activities in which drug traffi cking resources participate. 
In the balance of payments14, when reconciling it at the closing of the corresponding 
annual period, there appear statistical discrepancies, that are recorded in the account 
“Errors and Omissions”, to account for those operations that for several reasons are not 
annotated in the offi cial statistics. This account includes operations such as, differences 
caused by the disparity between the criterion utilized to value the transactions, as is the 
case of Guatemalan exports to the United States of America that are written at an FOB 
14 The balance of payments is fed with information collected by the central banks with the 
assistance of other institutions of the public sector (such as the customs offi ces), of the banking 
system and of the entrepreneurial sector, on the operations that the countries undertake with 
the rest of the world. 
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value15, while in the country of destination they are valued at CIF (which includes insurance 
and transportation at their full value), which generates an uncontrolled difference; also 
there are differences regarding the date in which a good is exported and the date when 
it arrives at its fi nal destination, which results in the values being registered at different 
times and cause differences in the collection of data. Also this could be the case of family 
remittances that are delivered personally by a relative traveling to his community and 
are not registered in the banking transactions. Likewise, it is general knowledge that at 
the borders of the countries in the region and other neighboring countries, merchandise 
goes in and out that not only do not pay duties (contraband), but no statistical record 
remains about its volume and value. 
In the case of Guatemala, information was obtained from the Bank of Guatemala 
(BANGUAT) that the value recorded in this account of “Errors and Omissions” in 2008, a 
year when the effects of the economic world crisis appeared, was of US $547.6 million 
while in 2009, it reached US $ 259.6 million and in 2010 (last data available) it was US 
$ 283.4 million.
Nevertheless, in the measurements made by the central Banks of the region, it is not 
possible to assign an added value in the national accounts to determine the magnitude 
and the growth rate of the Gross National Product (GNP), as well as to detect how much 
of the “Errors and Omissions” account in the balance of payments, correspond to the 
activities of drug traffi cking. 
While these diffi culties exist, a study made by the World Bank, estimated that 90 
per cent of the cocaine that arrives in the United States of America comes through the 
Central American corridor, also pointing out that the related fi nancial fl ows are enormous 
and the added value of the fl ow of cocaine from the Central American corridor might 
reach 5% of the regional GNP” (World Bank, 2011:ii). This percentage might be higher 
if it included the traffi c originated by other illegal operations that use the corridor of the 
Central American countries. For example, unoffi cially, it is estimated that for Guatemala, 
this percentage might be around 7.7% of the national GNP. 
15 FOB acronym of the English term Free on Board, refers to an incoterm, for purchase and sale 
operations where the transportation of the merchandise is done by ships. 
Towards the implementation 
of actions to abate the 
money laundering
The institutional and operational normative state of the situation, in which the Central American Countries are and the effects caused by money laundering, as described earlier, as well as the economic conditions through which each of the 
countries is going, justifi es and motivates the institutions that form laRed to consider 
these adverse situations as a window of opportunity to continue with the process of 
regional integration. 
Each one of the countries of the region on their own can hardly face the phenomenon 
of organized crime and drug traffi cking. The experiences of other countries who have 
confronted these phenomena as an armed struggle even when economic, technological 
and specialized human resources, have only been able to dim the phenomenon but not 
eradicate it or prevent the bloodshed of innocent persons, or prevent the insecurity in 
the affected areas. In any case, criminal violence against the citizens cannot necessarily 
be connected as a consequence of the involvement of the Armed Forces in the fi ght 
against drug traffi cking (case of Mexico). In fact, in Central America criminal violence 
is pre-existent to the phenomenon and to the Mexican response of war against drug 
traffi cking. However, at the present time the regional sum of resources is no longer 
capable to confront this problem with a greater intensity, enhancing the efforts made 
today by each one of the countries 
It is estimated that the right and viable thing for the region would be to confront 
this phenomenon through the protection of legitimate fi nancial markets and protect 
them against the assets of illegal origin; reducing the margin of probabilities to resort 
to the armed confrontation and bloodshed, a strategy that has only accomplished to 
temporarily dim this scourge but at a high cost in human lives. 
The prevention of crime must be made under the inverted logic used for the illegal 
businesses and trade, that is, it is necessary to generate adverse conditions for the 
investment of capitals coming from illegal activities (money laundering, drugs, weapons 
and crime), in order to yield less profi ts and greater risks, with the intention of pushing 
out these capitals 
In view of the above, laRed identifi es minimum conditions in the local and regional 
levels, for the design of a regional strategy against the bleaching of capitals, and to raise 
specifi c actions that could contribute to draft a strategy to abate money laundering in 
Central America, in various stages: prevention, detection, investigation and judging. 
In must be indicated that these suggestions must be part of the construction of a 
Regional Policy to combat money laundering, a responsibility of the authorities of the 
Central American countries that in order to obtain successful results, they require a 
3
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systemic approach to address the local and national causes, and the regional multi-
causes, with the different sectors of each country. 
Graphic No. 2
Strategic areas for the abatement of money laundering
3.1 Prevention and detection
It is inescapable that the countries of the region need to broaden and strengthen 
their legislation and the existing regulations, to typify criminal conducts that currently 
are not regulated, ticking to their needs and realities without prejudice of the joint efforts 
that must be made regionally, which is possible with the legislative harmonization16 
and an institutional Alliance to conduct coordinated efforts, taking as the basis, the 
development of the commitments made in accordance with the International Covenants 
and Treaties on the subject issue, that have been ratifi ed. 
Another aspect to be considered in the legislative harmonization is the different legal 
defi nitions of organized crime in each of the countries, the adoption of uniform criteria 
for an adequate characterization and the respective legal sanction, as well as the need 
to adapt the processes and instances to the specialty and complexity of the issue. Otro 
aspecto a considerar en la armonización legislativa son las diferentes defi niciones legales 
del crimen organizado en cada uno de los países, la adopción de criterios uniformes para 
su adecuada tipifi cación y la respectiva sanción penal, así como la necesidad de adecuar 
los procesos e instancias a la especialidad y complejidad de la materia.
The intervention of the existing regional entities and spaces is fundamental, for the 
drafting, promotion, launching, debate, discussion and approval of the absent regulations 
or those that are in process on the subject issue. The spaces are for example: the Forum 
of Presidents of the Legislative Powers of Central America and the Caribbean Basin; the
16 LaRed refers in its study on “Security and Transnational Organized Crime”, the concept 
differences between the legislative type-approval and harmonization; the former requires a 
process of uniformity that results in one legislation for all of the Isthmus while legislative 
harmonization recognizes the need for their own national provisions, but proposes to delete 
contradictions and regulatory obstacles. 
Prevention Detection Investigation Judging
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Conference of Ministers of Justice of Ibero-America (COMJIB) and the Central American 
Integration System, among others. 
The strengthening of institutions, transparency and Access to the information and 
combat for corruption through effi cient disciplinary systems in the public administration, 
seem to be prerequisites for the juridical structure related to the fi ght against organized 
crime to be a mechanism that will enable to confront, both nationally and as a member 
of the international community, the crimes of money laundering and the funding of 
terrorism. 
Promoting the banking of operations that are currently made in cash could contribute 
to detect suspicious operations, thus it being necessary to promote the benefi ts offered 
by the Banks and the fi nancial systems, so that the public who do not yet use them, can 
channel their operations through those institutions and the activities of intermediation 
of resources should be legislated such as those made by the micro-lending institutions 
that are not regulated (as in the case of Guatemala), in order for their operations to be 
also within the group of institutions under the supervision of the Special Verifi cation Unit. 
However, the implementation of this recommendation must be in a just balance, so that 
the weight of the requisites does not become suffocating for the micro-entrepreneur. 
The policy “get to know your client” must include the periodical verifi cation and 
updating of the data provided by him. The verifi cation measure can be implemented in 
a selective and progressive manner, depending on the amount and the costs entailed 
by such operations, while the data updating must be an obligation for the client, under 
the penalty of additional charges for omission or inaccuracy. These actions will enable 
to have a greater effi ciency and agility in the identifi cation of front companies, the 
“pitufeo”17 and others collaborating with money laundering. 
3.2 Investigation
In the national juridical frame, the jurisdictional function plays a determinant role, 
irreplaceable and unassignable. In all the processes whose objective refers to international 
organized crime and the funding of terrorism, as well as all the derived criminal actions, 
the judiciary is in the hottest point of the confl ict. The “interests” at stake are of various 
kinds and in most cases are of an extrajudicial origin. 
Therefore, it is convenient for the Judicial Organizations, to have specialized 
personnel so that their authorities can deal with these issues with capability and expertise. 
Therefore, the pensum of the judicial schools must contain the subjects related to these 
issues and thus form a solid judicial corps with competence on the subject matter. 
It cannot be overlooked that transparency in the justice administration on drug 
traffi cking and money laundering is under the scrutiny of the international community. 
The strengthening and creation of regional technical spaces (attorneys, judges, 
auxiliary justice personnel forensic auditors and accountants) for an Exchange of 
17 Defi nition of the Latin American Federation of Banks (FELABAN): Pitufeo, structuring or ant 
work that consists in making small deposits in the banking system in order to bypass recording 
and the respective reporting of cash transactions that go over a certain amount. Thus, one or 
several individuals (“pitufos”) are in charge of making multiple transactions that in an isolated 
manner do not represent considerable amount but all together make up an important amount. 
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experiences, lessons learned and good practices in the investigation and prosecution 
of the money laundering crime, will contribute to the design of guidelines for regional 
investigation in money laundering in order to implement them and update them 
periodically; such as the Network of Attorneys against Organized Crime, promoted by 
the United Nations Offi ce Against Drugs and Crimes (known in English as UNODC). 
These spaces that have a dual function, must be strengthened; the mentioned 
Exchange and the promotion of personal relations based on trust, that facilitate the 
formal and informal Exchange of information to provide data for the investigation of 
persons and suspicious activities, and alert the countries on them.
Also, carry out actions to combat tax evasion and fi scal paradises, since in an 
environment where tax evasion is frequent, it is usually accompanied by the highest 
levels of organized crime, related to the nature and scale of money laundering (Buscaglia 
y Dijk 2003).
3.3 Judging
In the national juridical frame, the jurisdictional function plays a determinant role, 
irreplaceable and unassignable. In all processes, the object of which refers to international 
organized crime and the fi nancing of terrorism, as well as all illegal acts derived from 
them, the judiciary is in the hottest point of the confl ict. The “interests” at stake are of 
diverse kinds and in most cases are of an extrajudicial origin. 
It is convenient for the Judicial Organizations, to have specialized personnel so 
that the judicial authorities can address this problem with capacity and expertise. Thus, 
the judicial school must contemplate the continuous and focalized formation for justice 
operators assigned to the courts of the subject matter, in order to form a solid and 
competent judicial corps. Conviene a los Organismos Judiciales, contar con personal 
especializado para que las autoridades judiciales puedan abordar esta problemática con 
capacidad y experticia. De ahí que, el pensum de la escuela judicial debe contemplar 
formación continua y focalizada para los operadores de justicia asignados a los tribunales 
de la materia, con el objeto de ir formando un cuerpo judicial sólido y competente. 
In view of the fi nancial conditions of the entities member of the justice administration 
systems, inter-institutional agreements should be subscribed on the joint formation of 
the human resources in charge of the subject matter in each one of the institutions, in 
order to increase the potential of their economic capacity and enable to alleviate the 
shortages in their existing capacity and abilities. 
The actions described may be implemented without prejudice or omission to 
strengthen the institutions in charge of the investigation and prosecution of the money 
laundering crimes or their creation with economic resources, multidisciplinary teams 
(forensic auditors, public accountants, informatics experts, lawyers specialized in banking 
and fi nance) who are specialized on this issue and updated in technology
As some additional considerations in terms of other actions to abate money laundering, 
it is necessary to recognize that it has diminished through the banking system, in view 
of the recent implementation of more rigorous controls through the institutions created 
for that purpose, however, it is necessary to emphasize that the diversity of the criminal 
activities made to launder money are characterized by versatility and fl exibility in their 
execution, which enables them to elude the national regulations, in addition to their 
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dexterity to implement changes in their operations and typology. One example of this is 
the war tax collected by the “maras” in Guatemala, which is deposited in Honduras and 
goes back to Guatemala through the banking system. The interconnection is their way of 
operating, both internally and in relation to other organizations. The strategic alliances 
among illegal networks are created through a strict entrepreneurial logic (UNDP, 2009). 
In view of the above, we must recall the recommendation to consider strategies that do 
not only combat the phenomena, but discourage the entrepreneurial logic of the crimes 
that precede the money laundering, and consider mechanisms to permanently revise 
operational strategies in the fi ght against organized crime in the face of the versatility 
and fl exibility of its execution. 
Furthermore, it is indispensable to consider actions in the frame of the Electoral 
System and of Political Parties, since the incidence of the members of these criminal 
groups is sensitive in local and national partisan politics. In spite of existing a regional 
trend to combat irregularities in the fi nancing of political parties by strengthening 
the function to control the electoral entities by means of legal reforms that are under 
discussion in the legislature, in fact, to date only Costa Rica enacted in 2009 profound 
reforms on this subject. So, it is essential to prioritize actions to reform the regulatory 
frame of the remaining Central American countries to discourage and prosecute the 
infi ltration of illegal funds in the political parties not only for the purpose of money 
laundering, but for the risks entailed by the payment of “political favors” that stimulates 
corruption. 
 Corruption as a preceding crime to money laundering, also deserves attention 
with measures such as those indicated above in the frame of strategies for institutional 
strengthening, but also to strengthen public policies on probity and transparency, 
conceived from an integral approach that contemplates actions to make effi cient the 
exercise of the right to access information and ensure the citizen participation around the 
drafting and execution of the public budgets, also addressing issues of tax transparency 
and indebtedness. 

Some conclusions and 
recommendations
1. Money laundering and its preceding crimes, are not only a technical 
problem of the specialized entities in banking supervision: they are 
associated directly to transnational criminal schemes as well as 
problems of corruption and impunity in the Central American States, 
and therefore affect democratic coexistence in a State of Law, as well 
as the governance of our countries
Money laundering and associated crimes, both by those who need to legitimize 
the profi ts of their illegal operations, as well as those public and private structures that 
accept them, have a corrupting power that demolishes our societies and our institutions. 
It being an activity that per se, is not deemed to be directly associated with blood 
crimes and violence, it must not be ignored that it is a key link in the criminal chain, 
both for the preceding crimes that require laundering, as for the multiplication of later 
activities that are against the law. Corruptors and corrupted become agents of infection 
and denaturation of our political systems, and of our citizen coexistence. The combat to 
money laundering, therefore, is one of the key pieces –although not the only one– in the 
confrontation with transnational criminal activities, as well as in the efforts to strengthen 
transparency, the rule of law and democratic participation. 
2. Money laundering and its preceding crimes are a global problem, 
therefore they require a regional integrated and integral vision
Money laundering and its more serious preceding crimes such as drug traffi cking, 
organized crime, corruption and terrorism are no longer local phenomena that compromise 
citizen’s peace and security of a certain country, and have become a global problem that 
puts at risk the stability of nations and of entire regions. In view of this, the region must 
work with an integrated and internal vision to confront not only the combat but also 
articulate in an integrated manner the prevention of these signs of the transnational 
organized crime. To the national efforts, to which each State and society are compelled, 
a regional effort must be made, increasingly more coordinated. 
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3. Central America needs to strengthen its intra-regional cooperation 
and that with the International Community
Central America has ratifi ed the main international instruments adopted by the 
International Community in the frame of the United Nations (UN), the Organization of 
American States (OAS), and in the regional area (CA), on the issue of drug traffi cking, 
organized crime, terrorism, funding for terrorism, corruption, money laundering and 
mutual juridical assistance on criminal issues. Its countries are members of the GAFIC. 
Nevertheless it is necessary to deepen into the cooperation and collaboration of the 
entities in the fi ght against these crimes, and in particular, it is necessary to coordinate 
the actions related to the prevention, prosecution and punishment for money laundering 
throughout its territory, as well as in the enterprises and fi nancial and non-fi nancial 
entities. For this type of tasks, the geographical border of Central America, of Darien 
–with Colombia– to Peten –with Mexico–, must be transnationally reconfi gured as has 
occurred with trade, fi nances or digital information. 
4. Central America needs to harmonize the information that will enable 
it to follow up on suspicious transactions
Central America needs to coordinate and harmonize the adequate implementation of 
effi cient measures of diligence on the clients, as well as maintaining a record of requisite 
of the regulated fi nancial entities, and of other non-regulated entities, but above all, 
coordinate the implementation of an adequate program of supervision and prevention 
of money laundering throughout the regional fi nancial sector, ensuring that its Units 
of Financial Intelligence can work in a coordinated fashion to follow-up on operations 
suspicious of money laundering in the region. 
5. Likewise, Central America needs to harmonize the current legislation 
to increase its capacity both, to protect legitimate trans-border 
economic activities, and to be more effi cient in the prevention and 
prosecution of transnational criminal activities
One of the major verifi cations of this study is the enormous disparity in legislations 
of each one of the countries, from the characterization of what is considered to be a 
crime in each of the Central American countries, its level of seriousness and the disparity 
of the penalties, as well as the disparity in the attributions and competence of the 
various institutions, and their capacity and extent of intervention to prevent, process 
and punish these illegal activities. Central America needs to coordinate and harmonize 
its corresponding legislation as well as the inter-institutional coordination both within 
each country and regionally. 
6. The risks of money laundering in the non-regulated fi nancial sector 
and in other economic sectors of the region
Central America must realize that it is not enough that the Banks are safe from 
money laundering, it is necessary to prevent the risks of money laundering activities 
in the rest of the national economy, and to the extent that important individuals, 
enterprises and sectors in high risk (both fi nancial and non fi nancial), continue to work 
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without adopting any program for prevention of money laundering or blanching of assets, 
they will generate greater risks of infection for the regional economy and its fi nancial 
system. Of special importance are the fi nancial or related companies that do not have 
a supervised prevention program such as: the savings and loan cooperatives, micro 
fi nancing associations or societies, money remittances companies, currency exchange 
places, pawn shops, casinos and gaming salons. Advancing in the issue of prevention 
at these enterprises will make it easier in the future, to establish some control or 
information mechanism on professions that ate especially sensitive to the activity of 
money laundering, such as lawyers, notaries, real estate agents, jewelers or precious 
stones merchants, accountants, auditors and trust entities. 
7. The guardianship of fundamental rights: presumption of innocence, 
due process, privacy, honor and habeas data
Central America must comply with international standards on the issue of prevention 
of money laundering and against the fi nancing of terrorism (PLD/CFT), but its procedures 
for drafting and analysis of the Reports of Suspicious Operations (ROS) must avoid 
putting at risk the right to privacy, honor and reputation of the persons subject of a ROS, 
for whom at all times, the principle of presumption of innocence, the right to an effective 
judicial guardianship, the right to a due process, the right to privacy, honor or reputation 
and the right of habeas data must be respected at all times. 
8. Adequate coordination to give way to a fi nancial intelligence unit in 
the region
The region must realize that coordination of the functioning of the fi nancial 
intelligence units that respond to the GAFI and Egmont Group international standards 
is just a fi rst institutional element in the fi ght against money laundering to give way 
to a harmonized action. In accordance with the international covenants subscribed 
(Palermo and Merida Conventions) such units must become “a dependency of fi nancial 
intelligence that may serve as a national center of collection, analysis and dissemination 
of information on possible money bleaching activities.” But the actions of the region 
cannot be integral if there is not a supra-state entity with the capacity to adequately 
harmonize the national anti-money laundering programs, that can also receive, analyze 
and conclude the analyses of the fi nancial information after the alerts and suspicions 
submitted by the fi nancial entities and the companies or obligated individuals in each 
State as a supra-national instance. 
9. Be Prepared for the implementation of a harmonized regional program 
PLD/CFT
Central America should begin to create the conditions in order to achieve, in a few 
years, the implementation of a regional program for the prevention and combat of LD/
FT, that involves secure and expeditious procedures in managing the ROS, improve 
the follow-up results and a better control of the fi nancial intelligence investigations, 
to ensure the confi dentiality of the information given by the obligated individuals, so 
that such information may be useful for judicial actions, but at the same time be duly 
sheltered and never misused or manipulated for alien interests.

